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The Challenge of Reforming the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding
T
he May 2003 deadline for the completion of the 
negotiations on improvements and clariﬁ  cations 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) under 
the Doha Mandate has not been met. However, Mem-
bers agreed in July 2003 to extend the deadline for the 
review until the end of May 2004. This article brieﬂ  y 
summarises the past six years of negotiations on the 
DSU review, the most contentious issues and the sys-
temic difﬁ  culties of the negotiations. We conclude with 
prospects for the forthcoming negotiations until 2004. 
The DSU: Rules for Settling Disputes in the WTO
The DSU contains the rules for settling disputes be-
tween WTO Members that arise under the agreements 
covered. In short, it provides for a procedure that 
starts with mandatory consultations as a negotiatory 
element. If the parties cannot agree to a settlement 
during these consultations within a certain period, the 
complainant may request a panel to review the matter. 
Panels engage in fact-ﬁ  nding and apply the relevant 
WTO provisions. Their ﬁ   ndings and recommenda-
tions are published in a report, which either or both 
of the parties may appeal. The Appellate Body is then 
to review the issues of law and legal interpretations 
in the panel report. It can uphold, modify or reverse 
the panel’s ﬁ   ndings. Subsequently, the reports are 
adopted in a quasi-automatic adoption procedure by 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) where all WTO 
Members are represented by a delegate. “Quasi-au-
tomatic” adoption means that the reports are adopted 
unless the parties decide by consensus (i.e. including 
the party that has prevailed) not to adopt the report. If 
it has been found that a trade measure is in violation 
of WTO law, the defendant must bring this measure 
into compliance with the covered agreements within a 
reasonable period of time, normally not exceeding 15 
months. If the defendant refuses to comply, the com-
plainant may ask the defendant to enter into negotia-
tions on compensation, or it may seek authorisation 
from the DSB to suspend concessions or other obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the defendant in an amount equivalent 
to the injury suffered. If the adequacy of implementa-
tion is disputed, the implementation measures are 
subject to further review under the DSU. Retaliation, 
if authorised, normally takes the form of punitive tariffs 
on a deﬁ  ned volume of the complainant’s imports from 
the defendant.
The DSU has often been praised as the “crown 
jewel” of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Key innova-
tions with regard to dispute settlement under the GATT 
are strict time-frames and the lifting of the former 
consensus requirement which allowed a defendant 
to block the adoption of an adverse ruling. Since the 
DSU entered into force on 1 January 1995, its provi-
sions have been applied to the settlement of some 300 
disputes on a wide range of topics. 
DSU Review: Fruitless Efforts Since 1998
Originally, a 1994 Ministerial Decision had called 
upon Members to complete a full review of the DSU 
by 1 January 1999, and to take a decision whether to 
continue, modify, or terminate the DSU at the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference. Despite intense discussions 
and an extension of the deadline until July 1999, no 
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result was achieved. After the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial in December 1999, the DSU review fell into 
an inconclusive limbo. Efforts to further the review dur-
ing 2000 and 2001 remained unsuccessful. It was only 
at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 
that a mandate for further negotiations on improve-
ments and clariﬁ  cations of the DSU was included in 
the Ministerial Declaration. Between spring 2002 and 
May 2003, 42 speciﬁ  c proposals were submitted by 
members, covering virtually all provisions of the DSU. 
The “Chairman’s text” of 28 May 2003, named after 
the Chairman of the negotiations Péter Balás, incorpo-
rates many of these proposals and was meant to serve 
as a basis for agreement.1 However, portions of the 
text are still bracketed (which indicates disagreement 
between the parties) and, more important, many of the 
more controversial proposals have been left out. Al-
though the text was not accepted by the negotiators, it 
is worth looking at in some detail. 
Searching for Compromise: The Balás Text
The Balás text contains a procedure to overcome 
the “sequencing issue” which arose over ambiguities 
(or even contradictions, as some may argue) in Art. 
21.5/22 DSU. It surfaced during the EC - Bananas 
case, where the WTO-consistency of the EU imple-
mentation measures was disputed. The key question 
is whether a “compliance panel” must ﬁ  rst review the 
implementation measures undertaken by a defendant 
before a complainant may seek authorisation to retali-
ate on grounds of the defendant’s alleged non-com-
pliance. Whereas the US initially opposed any idea of 
sequencing and favoured immediate retaliation, the 
EU and many other Members argued in favour of the 
completion of such a compliance panel procedure as 
a prerequisite to seeking an authorisation to retaliate. 
Over time, however, this debate lost its acrimony: after 
the US had been defeated in the US – Foreign Sales 
Corporations (FSC) case, it found itself unable to im-
plement the rulings in a timely and WTO-consistent 
manner. It subsequently agreed with the EU on se-
quencing for that particular case. This practice, which 
was also applied in other disputes, would now have 
been introduced into the DSU. 
The Balás text would also have brought noteworthy 
modiﬁ   cations at the appellate stage, introducing an 
interim review, and a remand procedure. In this proce-
dure, an issue may be remanded to the original panel 
in case the Appellate Body is not able to fully address 
an issue due to a lack of factual information in the pan-
el report. Remand panel reports could be appealed 
as well. The compromise text would have introduced 
numerous amendments in other areas, including, inter 
alia, housekeeping proposals, enhanced third party 
rights, enhanced compensation, strengthened notiﬁ  -
cation requirements for bilateral solutions, and special 
and differential treatment of developing countries. 
Contentious Issues
The controversial issues that have not been in-
tegrated into the text include, for instance, several 
elements of a proposal by the United States and Chile 
on “improving ﬂ  exibility and member control in WTO 
dispute settlement”. Obviously motivated by a series 
of defeats in trade remedy cases and a surge of criti-
cism of WTO dispute settlement from US Congress, it 
would have allowed the deletion of ﬁ  ndings in panel 
or Appellate Body reports by mutual agreement of the 
parties. Furthermore, it would have provided for the 
partial adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, 
and it called for “some form of additional guidance to 
WTO adjudicative bodies”. A majority of small and 
medium-sized trading nations refuses any increase 
of political control, as this would automatically beneﬁ  t 
the more powerful Members.
Another proposal that was not taken into account is 
the EU call for a permanent panel body. Whereas pan-
elists are usually government ofﬁ  cials or other trade 
specialists who are appointed ad hoc and discharge 
their tasks as panelists on a part-time basis and in 
addition to their ordinary duties, the EU wants to es-
tablish a roster of 15 to 24 full-time panelists. The EU 
hopes that this would lead to a professionalisation of 
the panel process and help overcome problems with 
the selection of panelists, as parties ﬁ  nd it increas-
ingly difﬁ  cult to agree on the composition of panels. 
Opponents of the proposal argue that members of a 
permanent panel body could be more “ideological” 
and might engage in lawmaking. They therefore feel 
more comfortable with the current system as it draws 
heavily on government ofﬁ  cials who are familiar with 
the constraints faced by governments. The EU equally 
failed in introducing a prohibition on “carousel” retali-
ation. Carousel retaliation consists of periodic modi-
ﬁ  cations of the list of products that are subject to the 
suspension of concessions if a respondent fails to 
comply with an adverse ruling. The US signed such 
provisions into law in 2000 as the EU did not comply 
with the adverse WTO rulings in the Hormones and 
Bananas cases. Although the provisions have never 
been applied, the EC continues to oppose them as it 
already did in the DSU review during 1999.  1 Document TN/DS/9, available at the WTO website.Intereconomics, September/October 2003
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The US, in turn, failed to have its proposals on 
increased transparency considered. The US wants 
to make submissions of parties to panels and the 
Appellate Body public, and it wants to allow public 
observance of panel and Appellate Body meetings. 
Particularly developing countries oppose such in-
creased transparency, as they fear “trials by media” 
and undue public pressure. Insisting on the intergov-
ernmental nature of the WTO, they also resist efforts by 
the US and the EC to formalise the acceptance of ami-
cus curiae or “friend of the court” briefs. Amicus briefs 
are unsolicited reports which a private person or entity 
submits to the adjudicative bodies in order to assist 
(and to inﬂ  uence) the Court in its decision-making. The 
issue had surfaced for the ﬁ  rst time in 1998 when the 
Appellate Body decided in US – Shrimp/Turtle that the 
panel had the authority to accept unsolicited amicus 
curiae briefs. That right was subsequently expanded 
in further disputes, causing outrage among many de-
veloping country Members. 
Developing countries, in turn, did not manage to 
introduce collective retaliation into the draft. It was 
meant to address the problems caused by the lack 
of retaliatory power of many small developing econo-
mies, such as those experienced by Ecuador in the EC 
– Bananas case. With collective retaliation, all WTO 
Members would be authorised (or even obliged under 
the idea of collective responsibility) to suspend con-
cessions vis-à-vis a non-complying Member.
Diverging Views on the Fundamental Orientation 
of the DSU
There are at least three major reasons why it has 
been so difﬁ  cult to agree on a compromise text. The 
ﬁ  rst one is disagreement on speciﬁ  c issues as outlined 
above, combined with a lack of political will to settle for 
a compromise. The second one is a more fundamental 
disagreement which blocks successful negotiations: 
the dispute settlement system has gradually moved, 
over the past few decades, from barely codiﬁ  ed prac-
tices relying heavily on diplomatic negotiations to an 
increasingly codiﬁ  ed litigation mechanism with strong 
emphasis on the rule of law. Currently, however, there 
seems to be no consensus on whether that trend to-
wards judicialisation should continue. Some proposals 
would contribute directly or indirectly to a strengthen-
ing of the rule of law, such as a professional perma-
nent panel body, increased notiﬁ  cation requirements 
for mutually agreed solutions, improved enforcement 
or strengthened third party rights. Other submissions, 
however, such as the US proposal on ﬂ  exibility and 
increased Member control, aim at reversing this trend 
and seek to strengthen the political element of dispute 
settlement. While one might expect at ﬁ  rst that this is 
largely an issue that divides larger and smaller nations, 
things are not as simple as that: many developing 
countries equally argue for strengthening the negoti-
ating mechanisms, as they are disappointed with the 
ﬁ  nal outcome of litigation. The Ecuadorian experience 
in the Bananas case has shown that retaliation as the 
last resort is ineffective for small developing countries. 
Not only do they lack retaliatory power because of in-
sufﬁ  cient market size, but they would also mainly harm 
their own development prospects by shutting out im-
ports from industrial nations. Moreover, litigation is ex-
pensive. Finally, overall political considerations (such 
as GSP preferences, ofﬁ  cial development assistance 
and many others) may prevent developing countries 
from engaging in litigation with developed countries.
Systemic Difﬁ  culties in Reforming the DSU
Thirdly, there are also systemic reasons for the low 
success of the DSU review: the dispute settlement 
mechanism has a “constitutional” character, as it con-
tains the basic rules for the settlement of any dispute 
that may arise under any of the covered WTO Agree-
ments. Factually, it also has a crucial function in inter-
preting the provisions. Not surprisingly, the decision 
to approve amendments to the DSU shall be made by 
consensus, as Art. X.8 WTO Agreement provides. As 
Rawls taught us, constitutional rules should always be 
agreed by actors in the “original position” and behind 
a “veil of ignorance” in order to prevent self-serving 
choices. In the reality of trade policy, however, such 
a veil of ignorance does not exist, as Members, after 
nearly 300 disputes,  know fairly well their own and the 
other parties’ vulnerabilities. The “context” in which 
the DSU review takes place thus creates difﬁ  culties on 
three levels in particular. 
• Firstly, the review is conducted in the light of the 
substance of the disputes that are brought to the 
WTO on a continuing basis, and in particular of 
the politically more controversial ones. It is in these 
disputes or in their respective context where all the 
crucial issues in the debate have arisen (sequenc-
ing and collective retaliation in Bananas, carousel 
in  Hormones, and amicus curiae in Shrimp/Turtle) 
and where country positions have been shaped. In 
addition, country positions are not only inﬂ  uenced 
by past experience but also by expectations with 
regard to looming disputes. For instance, the EC will 
have been aware during the entire review exercise of 
a potential challenge to its GMO regime. Indeed, a 
panel has now been established. FORUM
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• A second element of this context consists of speciﬁ  c 
procedural disagreements which, at the same time, 
are the subject both of on-going disputes and of ne-
gotiations on the DSU. For instance, the EC tried to 
settle the sequencing dispute by making it the sub-
ject of speciﬁ  c complaints in US – Certain EC prod-
ucts and US – Section 301. Similarly, a consultation 
request in US – Section 306 on carousel retaliation is 
still pending. Each time such a dispute is under con-
sideration and the outcome is unclear, no party has 
an interest in prejudicing its position through a prior 
agreement on the issue during DSU review negotia-
tions. 
• Finally, the third layer of this context consists of on-
going negotiations on material WTO law. The extent 
to which new disciplines such as the Singapore 
issues (e.g. investment, competition) could be sub-
ject to dispute settlement rules has a direct impact 
on Members’ approach to the DSU. This logic also 
holds for the re-negotiation of existing agreements. 
For instance, there is a clear link between the current 
Doha Round negotiations on WTO Rules (such as 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures) and the 
on-going US debate on the “standards of review” 
applied by the adjudicative bodies. It will clearly be 
more difﬁ  cult for the US to agree on new rules on 
trade remedies in a setting where the adjudicative 
bodies act independently than if they operate under 
close control of Members. 
Add to these considerations a dynamic aspect: this 
entire context is not static, but it evolves with each 
new (or merely expected) development that threatens 
to modify positions taken on the DSU review, thereby 
making negotiations even more difﬁ  cult. 
What Can We Expect from Negotiations Until the 
New May 2004 Deadline?
The foregoing analysis may help us to evaluate the 
context under which the review will take place during 
the following months as the new May 2004 deadline 
comes closer.
As far as potential outcomes are concerned, funda-
mental changes to the system must not be expected. 
Each of the more far-reaching proposals with implica-
tions on the fundamental orientation of the DSU (rule 
versus power-orientation) will not be acceptable to a 
substantial number of Members. Therefore, a package 
of mainly technical modiﬁ  cations seems to be feasible 
at best. Such a package, however, may not enjoy suf-
ﬁ  cient support from the large players (notably the EC 
and the US) as it will do little to satisfy their ambitions 
and improve their situation. 
Although the EC and the US are not the only par-
ticipants in the negotiations, much will depend on the 
evolution in (and between) Brussels and Washington. 
Figures available today suggest that the US will con-
tinue to be in a defensive position, because (as of 22 
July 2003) it was the complainant in only 10 active 
cases, as opposed to 21 active cases where it was 
the defendant. Of the latter, all but two concern trade 
remedies.2 More adverse rulings will therefore likely 
spur the criticism of Congress and prevent US ne-
gotiators from consenting to any package that would 
not increase political control. Interests could change, 
however, if the US prevailed in the new transatlantic 
trade dispute on Genetically Modiﬁ  ed  Organisms 
(GMOs). Rulings in the GMO case could ﬁ  nally set the 
stage for a comprehensive settlement of all outstand-
ing transatlantic trade disputes within a package. So 
far, the EU has consistently refused any package deal, 
probably because not all issues were on the table. If 
accounts could ﬁ  nally be settled, pressure from DSU 
negotiations could be lifted and a mini-package might 
become feasible. However, settling the many cases 
involving the US would not only have to involve the 
EC but many other important WTO Members such as 
Japan, China, India or Brazil. 
As this is a tremendous task, it is unlikely that the 
new May 2004 deadline for the DSU negotiations will 
be met – particularly now that the failure of the Cancún 
Ministerial has caused a severe setback to the Doha 
Round negotiations in general. 
A lack of progress on the DSU review does not, 
however, need to impair the functioning of the DSU. 
First of all, negotiators have missed several deadlines 
so far, and the DSU is still functioning relatively well. 
Secondly, provisional solutions have been found 
for most practical problems in DSU practice: For 
instance, countries make bilateral agreements on se-
quencing that bridge the gaps of Articles 21.5/22. With 
regard to the amicus issue, the Appellate Body has 
developed its own methodology which grants a lot of 
discretion. It is using this discretion wisely, displaying 
a general openness towards accepting amicus briefs 
while at the same time not giving them decisive weight 
in its decisions, at least not explicitly. And as some ob-
servers privately argue, the increasing judicial restraint 
which the Appellate Body exercises in trade remedy 
cases helps to appease growing US concerns with 
regard to an alleged anti-US bias of the system. These 
are just three examples which show that the system 
2 USTR: Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving the United States, updated 
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has displayed enough ﬂ  exibility to deal with new is-
sues as they arise. 
Whereas the timely completion of the DSU review is 
therefore less urgent, the improvement of the political 
decision-making mechanism will be crucial. Adjudica-
tive bodies are currently forced to issue rulings even 
on provisions that have been left deliberately vague as 
negotiators were unable to agree on clear treaty text. 
Interpreting these vague provisions in a legal adjudi-
cation procedure inevitably creates political tensions. 
These, however, are difﬁ  cult to correct as the political 
decision-making mechanism in the WTO is very weak. 
This imbalance between the inefﬁ  cient political deci-
sion-making mechanism and the efﬁ  cient adjudication 
mechanism causes problems for the long-term sus-
tainability of the WTO. Whereas the US proposal seeks 
to remedy the imbalance by introducing more political 
elements into the dispute settlement procedure, legal 
scholars strongly advocate an improvement of po-
litical decision-making. Changing the traditionally con-
sensus-based decision-making in the WTO, however, 
is yet a much more formidable task than the relatively 
limited DSU review.